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Abstract If there is a single discipline of science calling the basic concepts of
biology into question, it is without doubt microbiology. Indeed, developments in
microbiology have recently forced us to rethink such fundamental concepts as the
organism, individual, and genome. In this paper I show how microorganisms are
changing our understanding of natural aggregations and develop the concept of a
Darwinian population to embrace these discoveries. I start by showing that it is hard
to set the boundaries of a Darwinian population, and I suggest thinking of a Dar-
winian population as a relative property of a Darwinian individual. Then I argue, in
contrast to the commonly held view, that Darwinian populations are multispecies
units, and that in order to accept the multispecies account of Darwinian populations
we have to separate fitness from natural selection. Finally, I show how all these
ideas provide a theoretical framework leading to a more precise understanding of
the ecology of endosymbiosis than is afforded by poetic metaphors such as
‘slavery’.
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Introduction
Population thinking is embedded in the foundation of the modern theory of natural
selection (Mayr 1959; Godfrey-Smith 2009). We do not study evolution irrespective
of populations. Whether our object of study is a gene, an individual species, or even
a clade, there is always a relationship to entities of the same or a similar class.
Despite this obvious fact and suggestions from biologists calling for ‘a
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reexamination of the very concepts of what constitutes a genome, a population, an
environment, and an organism’(McFall-Ngai et al. 2013), due to recent develop-
ments in microbiology, the concept of population has not been rethought as those of
organism (Sleator 2010; Booth 2014) or genome (Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg
2008; Stencel and Crespi 2013) have been. However, it really ought to be, as
microorganisms are changing our understanding of natural aggregations. For
example, it has been reported that the human gut contains more than 1000 bacterial
species (Rajilic-Stojanovic et al. 2007) and that the number of bacteria in the human
body is approximately 10 times the number of human cells (Kurokawa et al. 2007)
disproved the idea that humans interact mostly with animals and plants and only
occasionally with microbes, such as influenza germs, that kill them. The picture
emerging from ongoing research is rather the opposite: humans interact mainly with
microorganisms and only ‘occasionally’ with animals and plants. How, then, can we
conceptualise a population to incorporate into a single idea entities such as
microorganisms and animals placed upon such distant branches of the tree of life?
There is only one theory with the capacity to unify biology in its entirety: the
theory of evolution by natural selection. A general concept of a population,
therefore, has to be developed under the banner of the theory of evolution.
Interestingly, some steps toward this unification have been taken. Peter Godfrey-
Smith, in his seminal work Darwinian populations and Natural Selection (2009),
developed a concept of Darwinian population which was supposed to serve as a
universal tool in explaining the process of evolution, from the evolution of wild
populations through evolutionary transitions to cultural change. However, he did not
spend much time showing how to look, using his framework, at multi-species
Darwinian populations. The aim of this paper is to show, therefore, that Darwinian
populations are, in fact, multi-species communities and that a reproducer‘s
framework may be a useful tool to understand their evolution. The paper is
organised as follows. Firstly, I argue, following Godfrey-Smith (2009), that
reproducers are units of selection. Then I show that it might be very hard to
distinguish (in accordance with the teachings of microbiology) a Darwinian
population by taking a group of individuals as a starting point. Accordingly, I
suggest thinking of a Darwinian population as a relative property of a Darwinian
individual—a set of reproducers that engages in fitness-affecting interactions with a
focal unit. Then I argue that there is nothing wrong with a multi-species account of a
Darwinian population as long as we distinguish Darwinian interactions from fitness.
Finally, I show how these ideas might be useful in understanding the ecology of
endosymbiosis. Mainly, I show that the ecology of endosymbiosis might be
understood in better terms than poetic metaphors such as ‘slavery’(Maynard-Smith
and Szathmary 1995).
Reproducers as units of selection
Lakatos (1970) argued that scientific progress is made through competition between
and eventually substitution of research programmes, that is, sets of interconnected
theories which designate directions of research and the way research itself is
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conducted. If so, then there are two great research programmes involved in debates
over levels of selection. The first is the result of the work of Dawkins (1976, 1982)
and Hull (1980). In their framework, the focal unit of evolution is the replicator (for
instance DNA), which transmits its structure intact from generation to generation.
Different forms of the proliferation of replicators across generations are caused by
interactors (in Hull’s terminology), or by vehicles (in Dawkins’s), that is, by
temporal entities produced by replicators in every successive generation, consti-
tuting their machines of survival. Thus, for evolution to operate through natural
selection, replicators, which pass down their structures from generation to
generation, and interactors/vehicles, which make certain replicators more or less
common across generations, are required. The second research programme, less
demanding but more generally useful, was first formalised by Lewontin (1970).
Here I follow the version developed by Godfrey-Smith (2009).
My starting point is evolution through natural selection (ENS). A population
which can undergo ENS must comprise causally connected objects (called here
Darwinian individuals), which must in turn be characterised by three properties.
Firstly, they must vary with respect to traits such as weight, intelligence or
biochemical pathways. Furthermore, these traits must influence the fitness output of
the Darwinian individuals. This means that differences in traits influence the
reproduction and survival of individuals. Finally, these traits must be heritable, at
least to some extent, by offspring. Evolution by natural selection, thus, will take
place in any population in which there are phenotypic variations, heritability, and
differences in fitness (reproductive output) caused, at least in part, by these
variations. Combining these three properties, we come to the conclusion that
Darwinian individuals must be reproducers (Griesemer 2000; Godfrey-Smith 2009),
because reproducers are the only units capable of transforming the resources they
find around them in order to produce more reproducers and thus are causally
responsible for parent-offspring similarity (fulfilling the heritability criterion
mentioned above). Assuming we have, therefore, a diverse population of
reproducers competing for limited resources, only some reproducers will obtain
them and produce offspring; others will undergo decay, gradually transforming
them back into resources: the thread which has linked them via parent-offspring
lineage to the first reproducer is broken. Indeed, such a population will experience
evolution by natural selection.
Interestingly, we find different kinds of reproducers in nature. Godfrey-Smith
(2009) cited three. The first are scaffolded reproducers: those entirely dependent on
external machinery. For instance, viruses belong to this category, because they need
the biochemical machinery of cells to reproduce. The second category includes
simple reproducers. Reproducers of this kind possess inner machinery, and thus
need only external resources to initiate reproduction. One example is a bacterial
cell. The third category constitutes collective reproducers, i.e. those built of simple
reproducers. In essence, a collective reproducer is an entity that can reproduce itself,
but which is also built of elements that can reproduce themselves. An example is
multicellular individuals built of eukaryotic cells. The above classification is not
artificial, but rather a consequence of the fact that evolution is a process not only of
differential reproduction of Darwinian individuals, but as well one that leads to the
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origin of new kinds of Darwinian individuals, called transitions in individuality
(Michod 2000; Godfrey-Smith 2009). These transitions occur when a group of units
comes together to form a higher level of unit that can undergo the process of natural
selection itself, as it becomes a new, collective reproducer, as in the case of
transition from unicellular to multicellular individuals (Buss 1988; Maynard-Smith
and Szathmary 1995) or from prokaryotic cells to eukaryotic cells containing
mitochondria that were formerly free-living cells (Margulis 1981). Of course, this is
not the whole story. Reproducers are much more diverse than the above
classification suggests. This diversity was extensively elaborated by Godfrey-Smith
(2009). For instance, collective reproducers such as animals and plants differ in their
method of reproduction, since some species multiply sexually, some through
fragmentation of the body and others via both routes. Such considerations are quite
interesting and illuminating; however, for the purpose of this paper, the classifi-
cation introduced above is sufficient.
The relativity of Darwinian populations
In the above considerations is a hidden assumption. Godfrey-Smith (2009) (like
many other researchers; see Lewontin 1970, Ridley 1996) began his considerations
of the process of natural selection by assuming the existence of a population of
causally connected individuals in which variation in character leads to differences in
reproductive output and is inherited to some extent. At the beginning, therefore, he
supposed that we are able to distinguish such a population from a mere aggregation
of things. What does this mean? At first glance, one may think it means that
Darwinian populations are objectively existing groups. Indeed, being a Darwinian
population is a property of a group. We can take a group of things and argue that it
is a Darwinian population because it fulfils certain criteria.
What criteria must a group fulfil to be called a Darwinian population? Basically,
if we take a group of different Darwinian individuals with varying traits, for us to
consider them as a Darwinian population they must engage in causal interactions
(fitness-affecting interactions). In other words, if we have a group of three
Darwinian individuals (A, B, and C), then A must be linked causally with B and C,
B with A and C, and C with A and B (Fig. 1a). We can call such a group Darwinian
because each member interacts with the others in a way that influences its fitness.
Thus, it seems that Darwinian populations are discrete units that can easily be
isolated from nature. This statement seems obvious and by no means controversial.
(b) (a) 
Fig. 1 Two kinds of population structure: group structure (a) and neighbour structure (b). A line
between two units indicates that they engage in fitness-affecting interactions
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After all, the essence of Darwinism is competition among members of a group.
However, I do not believe this is entirely true and neither, I suspect, does Godfrey-
Smith; he himself (2006) put forward some objections arguing that in the case of a
neighbour-structured population, one cannot distinguish a population of interacting
individuals so simply; the situation in such populations is too complex for that. Let
me recall his arguments to show why it might be misleading to take a collection of
reproducers as a starting point.
Consider that there is a group of four reproducers, A, B, C, and D, and that their
fitness is causally connected, that is, A influences the reproductive output of B, B
influences the reproductive output of C, and C influences the reproductive output of
D. Based on these causal connections, one can infer that these reproducers constitute
a Darwinian population, because interactions among these reproducers lead to
differences in reproductive output in the population. However, this would be
overreaching, since there is no causal connection between A and C or between B
and D or A and D. We may say that instead of a Darwinian group, we are dealing
with a Darwinian chain: fitness-affecting interactions occur between adjacent
elements, but not between those at opposite ends of the chain. The problem is, in
fact, more challenging, because this example is not abstract, but corresponds to real
problems. For instance, biologists are aware of gene flow between isolated
populations of sexual species. Given two populations X and Y, some individuals
from population X may interact with some individuals from population Y and so
impact their fitness. However, it would not mean that these two populations
constitute one Darwinian population, because such relations are constrained to a
number of members from populations X and Y. Indeed, members of those two
populations constitute, rather, a Darwinian chain.
At first glance, such considerations might seem to be merely interesting
intellectual fun, but, sadly, applicable only to certain special cases such as the one
outlined above. However, if we stop focussing exclusively on the interactions
between members of a single species, as in the above example, and if, moreover, we
accept that Darwinian interactions might take place even between species as distant
as viruses and apes, then it seems that a neighbour-structured population is the
dominant, if not the only, structure in nature. We can think of many fitness-affecting
interactions between species; however, generally we are inclined to think that the
most important interactions take place between individuals belonging to the same
species. This is intuitive and understandable; as Darwin put it a long time ago:
As species of the same genus have usually, though by no means invariably,
some similarity in habits and constitution, and always in structure, the struggle
will generally be more severe between species of the same genus, when they
come into competition with each other, than between species of distinct genera
(Darwin 1859, p. 59).
However, we can provide many examples from nature that contradict this view. For
instance, Van Andel (2005) undertook a review in which he showed that fitness-
affecting interactions between species (between different plant species, plant-
animal, plant-fungus, etc.) are very important in shaping the structure of plant
communities. This multitude of interactions provides a culture for abandoning group
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structure and accepting the dominance of neighbour structure in nature. Further-
more, with the inclusion of microorganisms, examples of this kind of interaction
multiply. This can be seen clearly today thanks to microbial ecology, which shows
that it is almost impossible to find a multicellular individual that does not engage in
fitness-affecting interactions with certain microorganisms (Zilber-Rosenberg and
Rosenberg 2008; McFall-Ngai et al. 2013).
What does this mean for our considerations? Let’s use an example. Every cat (I
want to have a cat like Schrödinger!) interacts with a group of cats, because he
competes for certain resources or for sexual partners. Furthermore, every cat
interacts with a group of bacteria that occupies its gut, because bacteria produce
certain secretions which, for instance, change the functionality of the cat’s digestive
system. However, secretions of a bacteria from the gut of Cat A do not influence the
digestive system of Cat B. Indeed, the bacteria from the gut of Cat A interacts only
with certain other bacteria that live in the same gut; and what is true concerning Cat
A is also true for bacteria from the gut of Cat B. We have here, therefore, a multi-
species neighbour-structured population. Indeed, it seems that every bacterium and
every cat has its own Darwinian population: a set of reproducers that influence its
fitness. And the Darwinian population of Cat A, Cat B and selected bacteria might
just more or less overlap. If we set this together with the frequency of interactions
between multi-cellular individuals and microorganisms (Zilber-Rosenberg and
Rosenberg 2008; McFall-Ngai et al. 2013) then we reach a simple conclusion: the
world of multicellular individuals is the world of neighbour structure.
Furthermore, there is another problem tied closely to the one described above. A
particular population characterised by neighbour structure need not remain in the
same configuration during the lifespan of the Darwinian individuals that built it up.
For instance, if we have a human being who interacts with a group of bacteria, then
it is very likely that during different episodes of his life, he will interact with
different microorganisms, because his food preferences and environment change, or
because he gets ill. For instance, research on human microbiomes has shown that as
people age, the species diversity of their symbiotic microorganisms changes
(Yatsunenko et al. 2012). Therefore, it seems that neighbour-structured populations
change over time, due to various perturbations.
The above examples show that even if causal interactions take place between
members of a group of reproducers, it does not mean there are Darwinian
interactions between all of them, or that these interactions remain the same during
the lifespan of Darwinian individuals. All of this derives from the fact that
populations are not permanent structures created once and for all by an artisan-like
demiurge responsible for the design and maintenance of the physical universe, as
Plato might have said, which might suggest that our aim as philosophers and
biologists is simply to find them in nature. Rather, nature is a very dynamic structure
that has been changing since the Big Bang and Darwinian populations of
reproducers emerged at one point and are still dynamically changing. They change
as units of selection (reproducers) multiply, evolve, and die, making the task of
drawing the boundaries of a Darwinian population very hard.
Does this mean that we cannot distinguish a Darwinian group from a mere
aggregation of individuals? I think we can do so; however, we have to accept that
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being a Darwinian population is not a property of a group but a relative property of a
reproducer. I do suggest, therefore, adoption of a reproducer’s eye view—indeed, to
take as a starting point not a collection of reproducers, but a single reproducer. We
take a reproducer and look for other reproducers which influence its survival and
reproduction and thus build the Darwinian population from the bottom up. This
would enable us to avoid the problems I mentioned above, since we are building a
Darwinian population through analysing the interactions of a given reproducer, thus
enabling us to exclude reproducers with no impact on its fitness.
Multi-species Darwinian populations
In the last section I treated interactions between microorganisms and multicellular
individuals the way biologists usually deal with individuals belonging to the same
species: if they continue to engage in fitness-affecting interaction, they constitute a
Darwinian population. Unfortunately, this is not the way biologists deal with multi-
species communities. I have therefore thrown out the old tradition of thinking about
evolutionary phenomena, which, as Bouchard pointed out (2014), focusses on
modelling interactions among entities of the same type:
Population approaches usually model the same type of entities at similar levels
of organisation (cells with cells, genes with genes, individual organisms with
individual organisms, groups with groups). But how are we to model evolving
assemblages of motley unrelated parts at different levels of organisation?
I need to say a couple of words, therefore, to explain why a multi-species account of
Darwinian population is the proper way to think about ENS and, furthermore, how
to understand ENS in diverse populations built of such distinct elements as fungi,
bacteria and cats.
If we start with a very basic account of natural selection—i.e. that evolution by
natural selection will take place in any population (a group of causally connected
objects) in which there are phenotypic variations, heritability, and differences in
fitness (reproductive output) caused, at least in part, by these variations—then we
have to, at least partially, abandon this tradition, because the consequence of this
account is that a lion, a gazelle and a virus belong to the same Darwinian population
as long as they continue to engage in causal interactions that influence their
reproductive output. Godfrey-Smith (2009) calls these interactions ‘competitive
interaction with respect to reproduction’, and denotes them as a (alpha), which
defines the extent to which increasing one individual’s fitness reduces another’s in
the population under consideration. Alpha is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to
1. The closer it is to 1, the more increasing the fitness of one individual reduces the
fitness of others. In the context of the last section, this might be redefined as the
extent to which increasing the fitness of a member of the Darwinian population of a
given reproducer reduces the fitness of the focal unit, and so it will be understood
here. For me, this parameter is a key that enables us to link a group of elements
within the Darwinian population of a given reproducer despite their phylogenetic
diversity. Let me present two scenarios to demonstrate this.
The relativity of Darwinian populations and the ecology… 625
123
Suppose there is a chimpanzee that competes with a group of other chimpanzees
for a limited number of bananas. Suppose, then, that the banana is a crucial resource
that is necessary to survive and reproduce. Suppose as well that other resources,
such as sexual mates, etc., are unlimited. Our chimpanzees, therefore, have no
problem acquiring resources other than bananas. In such a scenario, therefore,
competition would involve just one resource and differences in fitness would mirror
differences in acquiring bananas. Suppose that, in a second scenario, a chimpanzee
competes with a group of chimpanzees and cats; for both—cats and chimpanzees—
bananas are a crucial resource and all other resources are unlimited. Again,
therefore, competition would involve just one resource and differences in fitness
would mirror differences in acquiring bananas. Cats and chimpanzees that are able
to acquire them readily would increase in number over generations, and in the end a
particular phenotype of a cat or a chimpanzee (one that knows perfectly well how to
get bananas) might outcompete other chimpanzees and cats. These scenarios are, of
course, fictional. However, they show an important thing: in both scenarios there is
strong competition over resources that leads to the diverse reproduction of
individuals. It does not matter whether they belong to the same species or not,
because their reproductive output is limited. Their fitness is interdependent: the
more offspring I produce, the less you are able to produce; or, as Godfrey-Smith
(2009) wrote, ‘a slot I fill in the next generation is a slot that you do not fill’. This
might be easily understood when there is a strong competition among conspecifics.
However, the same goes for the competition between viruses and cats. Of course,
they do not compete for bananas directly like the cats and chimpanzees in the
scenario above. For instance, if we were to add viruses to that scenario, then they
would compete for bananas as well, but in a more abstract sense. Viruses would try
to use certain host resources (such as necessary nutrients that the host has
assimilated from bananas) for production of their own offspring. Indeed, viruses
would use resources that the host might have used to multiply. Thus, a slot that
might be filled by host offspring would be filled instead by viruses.
So far we have been considering only one side of the coin: namely, fitness-
affecting interactions with a negative impact on the fitness of the focal unit.
However, when we take a reproducer and look for the other reproducers making up
its Darwinian population, then we see that it engages as well in interactions exerting
a positive impact on fitness. I call these interactions fitness-enhancing. An
interesting question is whether their existence is necessary for evolution by natural
selection to occur in multispecies Darwinian populations. I think the answer is ‘no’.
I think that competitive interactions are more primal and fundamental than
enhancing interactions, and that the latter, in fact, evolve in response to the former.
As Nowak (2006) put it: ‘The question how natural selection can lead to co-
operative behaviour has fascinated evolutionary biologists for several decades’.
That said, co-operative interactions are considered much more complex, and a
fundamental issue in evolutionary biology is to understand the conditions under
which they can evolve from competitive interactions. To give an example of such
conditions: in algae, single cells co-operate to form clusters in response to
competitive interactions with predatory protists, because this strategy reduces their
chance of being eaten (Boraas et al. 1998; Fisher et al. 2016).
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In spite of this, I think that for natural selection to occur, competitive interactions
with respect to reproduction are sufficient; it is from them that fitness-enhancing
interactions derive. In other words, when there is strong competition between
Darwinian individuals, some of them might engage in co-operative actions with
others in order to enhance their common fitness. This kind of interaction might have
a positive influence on the fitness of the focal unit and change the outcome of
competitive interactions. Thus, in many cases, the Darwinian population of a given
reproducer would comprise individuals exerting both a positive and negative
influence on its fitness; the reproductive output of the focal unit would be the result
of these two types of interactions. However, they are not necessary, either for the
process of natural selection to occur in multispecies populations or for the
subsequent parts of this paper; thus, while interactions of this kind are very
interesting, I am not going to consider them more deeply.
However, Matthewson (2015), and Godfrey-Smith as well (2009), argued that
this is not the whole story (i.e. alpha) and that something more is needed in order to
have a population that might undergo natural selection. Building upon Templeton’s
(1989) idea of species, Matthewson concluded that a group of individuals engaged
in fitness-affecting interactions must be under the influence of mechanisms that
sustain their similarity in order to undergo paradigm natural selection. Thus, he
argued that we need another parameter, which he called exchangeability and divided
into genetic and demographic. The former refers to the ability to combine genes
with others in the group, the latter to a situation in which individuals occupy the
same niche and thus are under the same selection pressure. These additional
mechanisms, if strong, assure that the individuals in question are very similar.
Matthewson’s intention in introducing this new parameter was to avoid situations in
which a group of individuals is called a Darwinian population simply because they
have a high alpha value, when, in fact, they compete over just one crucial resource
and have nothing else in common. That’s right: they might be just two different
species, occupying niches that, despite one similarity, are completely different. For
instance, a chimpanzee and a virus. As a result, he argued, natural selection would
not lead to a situation in which fitter individuals take over a niche, as it is hard to
imagine a virus taking over a chimpanzee’s niche.
Well, I agree this is true, but, at the same time, I do not think that this is what
natural selection is about. Generally, evolution by natural selection concerns
causative interactions that lead to differences in the reproductive output of
individuals struggling for existence, as I argued above. Of course, very often
evolution by natural selection leads to a niche being taken over by fitter individuals.
This is the case when there are strong completive interactions among members that
exchange genes, as in sexual species in which a fitter allele may become fixed in a
gene pool. Sexual reproduction may even be very important, because it ‘speeds up’
the formation of new combinations of alleles, and cumulative adaptation might
emerge much faster within such a group of individuals (Morran et al. 2011).
However, I don’t think that exchangeability states whether there will be natural
selection; rather, it is just another parameter (albeit an important one) indicating
what the evolution of a population under consideration would look like. For
instance, given a high rate of exchangeability, we might see how one phenotype
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takes the place of another in a given niche, as when a bacterial strain evolves a new
trait that enables it to acquire resources more rapidly and, as a result, outcompete
other strains. However, given a low rate of exchangeability, Darwinian selection
might still exist on the highest level. For example, during the 1918 flu pandemic the
rate of exchangeability between the flu virus and human beings was low;
nevertheless, the reproductive output of many people was shaped mainly by
interactions with viruses.
Basically, I agree that exchangeability is an important parameter. However, I do
not think that it should be placed on the same level in the hierarchy as a, because
alpha is the parameter that decides whether or not there is a struggle for existence. If
alpha is high, then the individuals in question engage in Darwinian interactions
despite their low rate of exchangeability. However, if there is a high rate of
exchangeability but very low alpha, then there is no Darwinian selection, but only a
group of individuals that are similar because they occupy the same niche and/or can
potentially interbreed. Thus, I think that the Darwinian population of an individual
is determined by interactions that influence its reproductive output. The stronger
these interactions, the more there is a struggle for existence, and the greater the
likelihood that a population is Darwinian. Other factors such as exchangeability,
fitness enhancing interactions, variance, integration, etc. are secondary character-
istics of a Darwinian population that might help us understand how the community
in question will evolve.
Fitness incommensurability
I think you, the reader, might be puzzled right now, because if you accept the
statement that natural selection is taking place between phylogenetically distinct
species, than an obvious problem emerges: how to compare the fitness of a virus and
a cat when they are engaged in strong interactions that influence their reproductive
output? This is, I believe, a major problem that turns people away from the multi-
species Darwinian account of population. This is because natural selection is tightly
linked with the concept of fitness and this linkage dictates the way scientists think
about evolutionary phenomena. I believe it goes like this: if there is natural
selection, then there are differences in reproductive output, and if there are
reproductive differences then we can quantify and compare them and say who is
fitter. However, if we cannot compare them, then there is no natural selection, since
in that case, how can we say who is fitter?
Such logic creates the illusion that fitness and natural selection are very related
concepts. Indeed, it suggests that we cannot have natural selection unless we can
quantify fitness differences. I think that the first step, therefore, toward acceptance
of the multispecies account of a Darwinian population is to separate fitness from
natural selection, and to demonstrate that we can have the process of natural
selection without being able to make any claims about fitness differences. Thus, let
me add a couple of words about fitness, in order to provide a background to help
explain how to understand fitness in multispecies Darwinian populations.
Philosophical (such as ‘what is?’) and practical questions (such as ‘how to count?’)
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concerning fitness are very complex and have been debated for decades (Abrams
2012; Bourrat 2015). However, I put them aside here, because for the purpose of this
paper a few general remarks are sufficient.
Thus, let me start with a fundamental question: who or what is the bearer of
fitness? This is not a trivial question, given that fitness is not very well defined, and
has been ascribed to different types (or even groups, such as a given phenotype) of
entities (Abrams 2012; Bourrat 2015). My answer to this question will not be
surprising, since I have already answered it indirectly in this paper. The bearer of
fitness is simply a Darwinian individual, a unit adapted to the reproduction of itself.
It might be a simple bacterial cell or a complex collective reproducer such as a cat.
Even though collective reproducers are built of elements that are themselves
capable of reproduction (such as multicellular individuals built of eukaryotic cells),
I am inclined to argue that the bearer of fitness is a collective reproducer, because
the cells that make up a cat are adapted to the cat’s reproduction, and thus function
in a coordinated way to make more cats, as Michod (2009) put it: ‘‘By specializing,
cells relinquish their autonomy in favor of the group; as a result, fitness and
individuality are transferred from the level of the cell to the level of the group.’’ The
exception would be cancer cells, which are adapted to reproduce themselves rather
than the collective reproducer they are part of; however, they are irrelevant to the
purposes of this paper. Thus, in this context, fitness differences simply mean
differences in the reproductive output of Darwinian individuals.
This is the way we usually think of fitness differences when discussing fitness.
For instance, if we take two cats that are in reproductive competition, and one has
more offspring than the other, then we tend to say that the first cat is better fitted to
the environment (has a higher level of fitness), because it copes better with
environmental factors, which results in its having more offspring. On the other hand,
when we see a virus that infects a cat and has a lot of offspring, while the cat, which,
due to the presence of this virus, has none, we are not really inclined to say that the
virus is fitter than the cat. Why not? After all, in both scenarios we have reproducers
engaging in competitive interactions which affect their reproductive output.
The reason is that fitness is supposed to give us information on how well
particular individuals are adapted to a particular environment (Dennet 1995;Bourrat
2015). Unfortunately, a virus and a cat, although they may engage in fitness-
affecting interactions, are adapted to completely different environments. Thus, it
makes no sense to compare their reproductive differences, because their fitness is
incommensurable. This basically means that we should not judge their reproductive
outputs by the same standards, since they are an effect of totally different
environmental factors (ranging from generation time through sexual selection to
other abiotic/biotic factors) to which both cat and virus have been adapting for many
generations. Indeed, for the former, producing two offspring is a success, while for
the latter, a thousand offspring would not qualify as a success. Hence, comparing
their reproductive success is pointless and inconclusive, since they have adapted to
totally different environments. In other words, in order for us to compare the fitness
of two units, they must be subject to very similar selective forces. I think, therefore,
that the idea of exchangeability may be a good measure of fitness commensurability,
because if there is a high rate of exchangeability, the individuals in question are
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subject to the influence of mechanisms that sustain their similarity and so plausibly
occupy the same niche (abiotic and biotic), i.e. they are under the same selective
pressure.
The idea of fitness incommensurability provides us with a basis for separating
fitness from the process of natural selection. On one hand, natural selection is a
process that leads to different reproductive outputs of reproducers engaged in
fitness-affecting interactions. On the other, fitness is supposed to determine which
individual is better adapted to a given environment. These two ideas are very useful
as long as we are dealing with subjects with a high level of exchangeability, such as
two cats that engage in fitness-affecting interactions: here we have two units that are
undergoing evolution driven by natural selection, and we can say which one is fitter.
However, these two ideas are not as useful when we have two units characterised by
a low level of exchangeability, such as a cat and a virus. They might both be subject
to strong selection, since the virus might be extremely virulent and thus might
influence the fitness of the cat, but at the same time have a very low rate of
exchangeability. Therefore, such interactions, even though they are extremely
important, do not permit us to legitimately compare the fitness of a host and a
pathogen, since they are adapted to different environments (both biotic and abiotic)
and thus their fitness output is not comparable. The conclusion, therefore, is that we
can have evolution driven by natural selection, and yet be unable to draw any
conclusions about fitness differences, since units that engage in Darwinian
interactions differ substantially.
I think that my use of Matthewson’s (2015) idea of exchangeability constitutes a
useful refinement of the ideas of Godfrey-Smith (2011), which he presented in his
discussion on multispecies interactions. Godfrey-Smith (2011), in his response to
Sterelny’s criticism (2011), argued that, in the case of multispecies combinations
such as acacias and ants, we should distinguish two Darwinian subpopulations, each
of which operates as part of the other’s environment. As the reader might deduce
from the previous section, I do not agree with this distinction, since, as I have
argued, there are no good theoretical reasons not to have multispecies Darwinian
populations. Indeed, Darwinian interactions may take place even between phylo-
genetically distinct species. Thus, what Godfrey-Smith distinguished were not
Darwinian groups but groups of commensurable individuals, or groups charac-
terised by high rates of exchangeability, which enables us to draw conclusions about
fitness differences within them. However, I still find this division useful for practical
reasons. This is because a good part of science comprises research which attempts to
determine which individuals are better adapted to a given environment. Thus,
singling out individuals with commensurable fitness and treating the rest as an
environment is a useful simplification that might serve many research purposes.
My conclusions, therefore, concerning fitness in multi-species populations are
different than those put forward by Bouchard (2014). He suggested that in the case
of multi-species communities we should abandon reproductive output as a measure
of fitness and focus on the persistence of communities as a better measure. I think
this is unnecessary, provided we accept our inability to compare the fitness of all
elements of such communities. While I do not discount the possibility that
persistence may be a good long-term indicator of fitness, I think that, within
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populations, reproductive output seems to be the most practical approach. In the
next section I will show how it (together with other concepts from this paper) might
be useful to understand the ecology of endosymbiosis
Ecology during the origin of endosymbiosis
One of the most interesting issues in evolutionary biology is our understanding of
how collective reproducers such as multicellular individuals or eukaryotic cells
evolved from lower ones (Buss 1988; Maynard-Smith and Szathmary 1995; Okasha
2006; Godfrey-Smith 2009). Why did lower-level units come together to form a
higher unit? Why didn’t selection at the lower level disrupt the functionality of the
higher unit? To solve these and many other relevant issues, researchers have made
extensive use of concepts that were primarily developed to study ecological issues,
such as cooperation, mutualism, conflict resolution, etc. This was a fairly useful
approach, leading to the expansion of our knowledge and I believe it will continue
to be useful in future.
At the same time, however, it seems that it is sometimes hard to extrapolate
concepts from ecology, because it is not clear how to do so. One paradigmatic case
is the origin of cellular organelles like mitochondria or chloroplasts. While it is very
easy to say, as some do (Margulis 1981; Sachs and Simms 2006), that symbiosis
between a host cell and an endosymbiont is an example of cooperation, because
both participants benefit (i.e. the host obtains certain products and the bacteria
reveives protection), understanding the origin of this symbiosis in ecological terms
is much more complex. This derives from the absence of free-living organelles;
thus, as Maynard-Smith and Szathmary argued in their seminal work The Major
Transitions in Evolution (1995), we cannot measure their fitness and compare it
with that of mitochondria. However, I will go even further here and say that even if
someday we were to find a free-living mitochondrion (whatever that might be),
measuring its fitness would not enable us to decide whether the transition from a
free-living state to life as an organelle was beneficial to the bacterium or not,
because this question makes no sense. Why not? Let’s try to look at this ancient
event from the perspective of the bacterium that was engulfed.
Suppose there is a bacterium that competes with two other bacteria for limited
resources. Suppose as well that there is one parasite. If the parasite makes our
bacteria a host, then it is reducing the fitness of the bacteria, because it may curb its
abilities and reduce its acquisition of resources compared to the other two bacteria.
As a result, the other two bacteria can multiply at a higher rate. However, if the
parasite engulfs our bacteria and transforms it into an organelle, then it
automatically changes our bacteria’s Darwinian population. Indeed, the bacteria
no longer competes for resources with the other two bacteria, but may, for instance,
compete with other parasites for hosts. Indeed, it is placed under different selection
pressure. Asking, therefore, whether endosymbiosis reduced or decreased the fitness
of endosymbionts compared to free-living bacteria is pointless, because following
this event the fitness of free-living bacteria and endosymbionts is incommensurable.
That‘ because an indicator of a high level of fitness prior to endosymbiosis (such as
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a high rate of multiplication or defense against predators, etc.) might be meaningless
after endosymbiosis and, alternatively, an indicator of a high level of fitness
following endosymbiosis (such as decreased virulence) might have been of no
significance previously. Comparing levels of fitness (by measuring rate of growth,
etc.) would thus be pointless and inconclusive in light of the completely different
environments to which the individuals in question have adapted. Indeed, from the
perspective of a free-living bacterium, it may be a good thing to multiply, but from
the perspective of an endosymbiont it may lead to damaging the host and thus to
reducing its fitness; since they are now reproducing as a whole, their evolutionary
‘success’ is linked (Leigh 1991; Stencel and Crespi 2013).
At first glance the above considerations seem to be correct. Unfortunately, there
is still a flaw in the logic. Contrary to Maynard-Smith and Szathmary (1995), I do
not think that there is, in fact, any sense in comparing the fitness of an organelle
with that of a free-living bacterium from a sister lineage. This is because following
endosymbiosis, as I pointed out, an organelle becomes part of the collective
reproducer. That’s right: an organelle and its host cell constitute one Darwinian
individual that is undergoing evolution as a whole by means of natural selection.
Therefore, we have to compare the exchangeability of this entire new unit with the
sister lineage of the endosymbiont to see whether we can say something about the
superiority of this newly evolved unit over the free-living ancestors of the
endosymbiont in terms of fitness. And since the origin of life there have been many
different scenarios; thus, looking at this issue from the perspective of the collective
reproducer is much more complex than from the organelle’s perspective. Let’s have
some fun picturing this diversity of endosymbiosis and consider two plausible
scenarios.
One of the most ancient episodes of endosymbiosis is the evolution of a protocell
from free-living replicators encapsulated inside a membrane, whereby a new unit
composed of lower-level elements emerged (Maynard-Smith and Szathmary 1995).
The advantage of this transition was that the replicators inside the cell were linked
and could perform a variety of tasks. Indeed, each free-living replicator had to
perform all tasks in order to reproduce, while a group inside a ‘bag’ could divide
labour and perform tasks more effectively and, as a result, outcompeted free-living
replicators. In this scenario we could have compared—with a large degree of
probability, I think—the fitness of free-living replicators with the fitness of those
encapsulated, because they were adapted to the same environment and some of them
just ‘decided’ to jump into a ‘bag’ without leaving their niche. Thus, it is very likely
that the degree of exchangeability of the ‘replicator bag’ and a free-living replicator
was very high back then.
The above example of endosymbiosis is characterised by the fact that the units
that were undergoing transitions in individuality were characterised by a high
degree of exchangeability at the very beginning. However, endosymbiosis
sometimes involves agents with a low degree of exchangeability. My favourite
example is endosymbiosis between the bacteria Buchnera sp. and aphids (Baumann
2005). In this scenario it is very likely that the fitness of the newly-evolved unit
would be incommensurable with that of a free-living bacterium, because it is part of
a collective reproducer that competes currently with different reproducers. Indeed,
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the newly-evolved unit (the aphid that the bacterium is part of) does not compete
with the same units as a free-living bacterium, but is currently under different
selective pressure. However, this is not the whole story concerning this ancient
event. So far, we have been considering only the endosymbiont’s perspective. If we
zoom in on the Darwinian population of the host that engulfs our bacteria, then we
will draw different conclusions. Following endosymbiosis, the host, as opposed to
the endosymbiont, abruptly changes not its Darwinian population, but its inner
structure. Indeed, the host cell is still competing with the same reproducers, but at
the same time it acquires a lot of new genes, raw material for natural selection to
work on.
Of course, I have presented only two scenarios of endosymbiosis and there may
be many other possibilities. For instance, the exchangeability of the collective
reproducer might differ from that of both the host and endosymbiont, because their
fusion might lead to the emergence of a new trait which enables it to occupy a new
niche. However, my aim is not to give a review of plausible scenarios, but to show
that we may think of the origin of endosymbiosis in more precise terms than using
poetic metaphors such as ‘slavery’ (Maynard-Smith and Szathmary 1995), which
are very beautiful, but have no epistemological content. Alternatively, by thinking
of a Darwinian population as a property of a Darwinian individual, we might follow
the paths of agents that are undergoing endosymbiosis and understand how their
Darwinian populations change during that event, i.e. whether the exchangeability of
the agents in question changes compared to that of agents that did not undergo
endosymbiosis. Understanding this, let us ask questions about the adaptivity of
endosymbiosis. For instance, it might happen that the exchangeability of agents
does not change much during this process (recall the origin of the protocell) and the
fitness of a collective reproducer is still commensurable with that of free-living
entities from a sister lineage; thus, we can draw conclusions about the fitness
superiority or inferiority of the newly-emerged reproducer. Alternatively, in other
situations, the exchangeability of the unit that came into existence might change so
much that their fitness would not be commensurable, at least for one of the
participants of endosymbiosis (recall the symbiosis of the aphid and the bacterium).
The conclusion is that after endosymbiosis, the exchangeability of one agent (or
both) might change so much that it would make no sense to compare its fitness with
members of the sister lineage. However, as I pointed out in the last section, they
might still engage in fitness-affecting interactions. This would happen if a parasite
were to become part of the host and find itself under pressure to evolve an effective
immune system, while members from the sister lineage were under pressure to
overcome the immune system of the host. Their exchangeability has changed
drastically, but they are still engaged in fitness-affecting interactions; one is part of
the environment of the other and vice versa. We cannot compare their fitness, but it
may be still interdependent, provided they continue to engage in fitness-affecting
interactions; thus it might happen that ‘(…) a slot I fill in the next generation is a slot
that you do not fill’ (Godfrey-Smith 2009).
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Concluding remarks
Recent discoveries in the field of microbiology have been systematically
transforming the way we see the biological world surrounding us (O‘Malley
2014). One of the most astonishing discoveries was the finding that living
individuals that we had perceived as belonging to well-defined categories, such as
plants or animals, can function properly only in the presence of symbiotic
microorganisms, which may be necessary for the development of immune systems
(Mazmanian et al. 2005) or digestation of necessary nutrients (Ley et al. 2006) and
may even influence mating preference (Sharon et al. 2010). Thus, viewing living
objects as mosaics of hosts and microorganisms is no longer controversial. In this
context, Dupré and O’Malley (2009), using a framework developed by Hull (1980),
argued that we should consider such a collaboration of host and microorganisms
engaged in a network of biochemical interactions to be ‘the most fundamental unit
of selection’. In this paper, I have taken another approach: using Godfrey-Smith’s
(2009) elaboration of natural selection, I have argued that each unit that reproduces
as a whole should be considered a unit of selection, and the remaining units that
influence its fitness should be counted as members of its Darwinian population,
which may be a multispecies unit. Thus, in this context, a microbe and a host which
are engaged in a network of biochemical interactions but which do not reproduce as
whole do not constitute a unit of selection, but rather two independent units engaged
in a biochemical network. This is because, for instance, microbes were for many
generations part of the host’s Darwinian population, and the host may have adapted
through making good use of the microbes’ biochemical machinery. Thus, my paper
offers an alternative way of looking at the host-microbe relationship.
This paper contributes to the solution of another major problem: understanding
the role of natural selection in the evolution of collective reproducers, such as
multicellular individuals or eukaryotic cells that have evolved from lower cells
(Buss 1988; Maynard-Smith and Szathmary 1995; Okasha 2006; Godfrey-Smith
2009). A common question is: why did lower-level units come together to form a
higher unit? A common approach to answering this question is to look for the
adaptive advantages of such a transition—in other words, to find selective forces
which would allow natural selection to choose collective reproducers over simple
ones and so promote a transition to a collective ‘lifestyle’. To recall, in algae, single
cells co-operate to form groups in response to competitive interactions with
predatory protists, because it reduces their chance of being eaten (Boraas et al.
1998; Fisher et al. 2016). Recently some researchers have suggested that the early
stages of such a transition (formation of a group) might occur without the
participation of natural selection (Fleming 2012; Fleming and Brandon 2015). As
Fleming and Brandon (2015) put it, ‘Groups are expected to form based on the
underlying tendency of evolutionary systems to increase in variance’. My work on
endosymbiosis shows that the formation of a group may sometimes be non-adaptive,
at least for one of the participants. For instance, when one single cell engulfs
another, this may be adaptive for the host cell, as it acquires a lot of new genes—
raw material for natural selection to work on—which may provide immediate
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benefits for the host. This, as Haynes argued (1990), can therefore be considered,
from the perspective of the host cell, a mega-mutation. However, from the
perspective of the engulfed unit, it may be strictly a non-adaptive process. This
might occur when endosymbiosis changes the unit’s Darwinian population entirely
and when, following endosymbiosis, it has to compete with different individuals.
Indeed, in such a situation an endosymbiont is taken out of competition with the
members of its old Darwinian population and acquires new competitors. Therefore,
to draw a parallel with card games, we can say that endosymbiosis, for such a unit,
resembles shuffling a deck of cards (a Darwinian shuffle): an endosymbiont is dealt
a new hand and the game starts again. Natural selection then rejoins the game and
selects the most optimal combinations of host and endosymbiont. Thus, my work
shows that during evolutionary transitions there may sometimes be room for the co-
operative play of chance and natural selection, but this need not always be the case
(recall the evolution of the protocell).
Assuming that Darwinian populations are relative properties of reproducers is a
very fruitful approach which enables me to understand how to set the boundaries of
multispecies Darwinian populations and to provide a novel understanding of the
ecology of endosymbiosis. However, even though I am convinced that this is the
proper way to think about Darwinian populations, I am aware that this approach
might not be particularly useful in connection with certain other scientific issues.
For instance, if one wishes to study the dynamics of multispecies communities,
constituting hundreds of individuals belonging to many different species, in order to
understand how they influence the pedosphere, then focussing exclusively on the
Darwinian population of a given reproducer might obfuscate the bigger picture. As
Bruce Lee put it in Enter the Dragon: ‘Don’t concentrate on the finger or you will
miss all that heavenly glory’. This is because some important changes in the
pedosphere may be caused by the interactions of microbes that do not engage in
fitness-affecting interactions (such as geochemical cycles), but instead, for instance,
remain at the extremes of neighbour structure (Fig. 1b). One good way not to miss
‘all that heavenly glory’ is to try to visualise these networks of interactions so as to
include interactions of different kinds. Such a project is very ambitious and beyond
the scope of this paper. The first steps in this direction, however, were taken by
Bapteste and Dupre (2013), who attempted to provide such a multidimensional
framework taking into account many different types of interactions. I think this is a
valid direction and that biology will gradually move toward it in order to attain a
deeper understanding of the factors shaping the diversity of the biosphere.
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